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INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), the international financial 
system has – more intensely so since the start of the summer – seen tensions worsen 
notably. The main and intertwined factors behind this are the worsening of the sovereign 
debt crisis in the euro area, the funding difficulties facing banks and the deteriorating 
economic growth outlook.
The difficulties in designing a new aid programme for Greece prompted a heightening of 
instability on European financial markets in June and July. Doubts over sovereign debt 
markets were not confined to relatively small economies, but spread with intensity to other 
larger countries, Spain and Italy in particular. The seriousness of the situation led to the 
adoption of various agreements at the European summit of Heads of State or Government 
on 21 July, shortly after the publication of the European banking stress tests. Despite these 
measures, tension persisted and the European Central Bank reactivated its Securities Market 
Programme, while continuing to ensure European deposit institutions had access to liquidity.
As in other European countries, the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has interacted 
negatively with the situation of the banking sector, substantially hampering access to 
medium- and long-term wholesale funding, as reflected in the low issuance volumes on 
wholesale markets. Against such a complex background, the process of recapitalisation of 
the Spanish financial system launched by Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 was finalised.
The aim of the recapitalisation of the banking sector was that all Spanish banks should 
have a core capital ratio of at least 8% (10% under certain circumstances). Those that did 
not meet the new minimum requirements had until 30 September to increase their capital, 
either through private investors or through the FROB. On 30 September the Banco de 
España reported on how matters had unfolded, reporting a contribution of €7.55 billion by 
the FROB and the raising of €5.84 billion of private capital, making for total additional 
capital of €13.39 billion for those institutions that have had to strengthen their capital to 
meet the new minimum regulatory requirements.
The persistence of the strains and the uncertainty over the euro area sovereign debt 
situation and the European banking sector led to new agreements at the European summit 
of EU Heads of State or Government on 26 October. These agreements are limited to three 
areas: (1) the search for a solution for the case of Greece that includes a voluntary 
acceptance by the private sector that amounts to a nominal discount of 50% on Greek 
debt; (2) the expansion of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF); and (3) a 
programme to recapitalise European banks that involves raising the Core Tier 1 capital 
ratio to 9% and marking to market all sovereign debt exposures.
In the difficult macro-financial environment prevailing since the publication of the last FSR, 
credit to the residential private sector in Spain continues on a declining course. This 
reduction in credit is not unrelated to the necessary adjustment in the level of indebtedness 
of some non-financial corporations and households, following the strong rise in such debt 
in the years prior to the crisis breaking.
The weak performance of the economy coupled with the continuing instability on financial 
markets make for an uncertain setting that might result in increases in bad debts on top of 
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those already seen. In any event, the rise observed in the doubtful assets ratio has been 
particularly concentrated in real estate development activity, reflecting the impact of the 
severe adjustment in this sector. The information required by the Banco de España of 
banks to detail their exposure to real estate development activities shows that the coverage 
of problem exposure to this sector stood at 33% as at June 2011.
The medium- and long-term wholesale funding markets have remained practically closed. 
As a result, most European banks, like their Spanish counterparts, have scarcely made any 
issues over the past months. Unsecured money market activity in the euro area has also 
fallen off notably. Nonetheless, secured short-term financing activity through the central 
counterparty clearing houses has functioned normally. Furthermore, the Eurosystem has 
continued to ensure access to liquidity. Spanish banks’ difficulties in gaining access to 
funding markets have been reflected in a fresh increase in recourse to Eurosystem 
financing, albeit with considerably less intensity than that recorded in the summer of 2010, 
when such recourse peaked.
Spanish deposit institutions continue to post positive rates of change for non-financial 
corporations’ and households’ deposits, in contrast to the attendant rate for credit 
extended. Should this pattern persist, it will partly alleviate borrowing needs on financial 
markets in the coming months.
The profitability of Spanish deposit institutions remains subject to certain pressures, 
deriving mainly from the high weight of asset impairment losses and the narrowing of the 
net interest margin. The latter is due to several factors which will tend to persist in the 
coming quarters, particularly sluggish activity, high financial costs and the sizeable amount 
of doubtful non-interest-earning assets. One key factor that might counter these elements 
bearing down on profits is the reduction in operating costs, something obligatory at 
institutions undergoing restructuring, and likewise advisable for all other financial institutions.
In conclusion, the current landscape in the euro area is one of financial tensions not 
witnessed since the Lehman Brothers crisis. It is the outcome of interacting and as yet 
unresolved tensions surrounding the sovereign debt crisis, the banking sector’s ability to 
obtain funding and a bleaker economic growth outlook. This situation led to new 
agreements at the European summit of Head of State or Government on 26 October. 
Compounding the situation in Spain is the ongoing severe adjustment in the real estate 
development and construction sector.
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1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Since the publication of the previous report, developments on international financial 
markets have been marked by a notable worsening of tensions and greater risk-aversion. 
These developments have been very closely tied to the deterioration and spread of the 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and to a bleaker growth outlook globally and, 
especially, in the US economy.
In the euro area, difficulties in agreeing on a new aid programme for Greece and, in 
particular, the debate over the participation of private investors in the programme prompted 
renewed turbulence in June and July, which particularly affected Spain and Italy. The 
instability continued despite the agreements reached at the European summit of Heads of 
State or Government on 21 July (which, along with a new support package for Greece, 
envisaged a broader set of measures to improve the sustainability of Greek debt and to 
curtail the risk of contagion; see Box 2.1). It only began to abate from the second week in 
August, following the ECB Governing Council’s decision to reactivate the Securities Market 
Programme, extending it to Spanish and Italian debt, and the announcement of economic 
policy measures by the Spanish and Italian governments. Adding to the foregoing measures 
are those announced by the European Commission. In particular, and reflecting the 
difficulties European banks continue to face (difficulties intertwined with the sovereign 
debt crisis and with the weaker growth outlook), State aid for the bail-out and restructuring 
of credit institutions beyond 2011 has been extended, whereby such aid will be sustained 
under the same terms next year. Finally, the persistence of the macro-financial tensions 
led to the agreement of new measures by the European Heads of State or Government on 
26 October (voluntary contribution by private creditors that amounts to a nominal discount 
of 50% on notional Greek debt, strengthening of the EFSF and recapitalisation of the 
European banking sector to achieve a Core Tier 1 ratio of 9% and marking to market of 
all its sovereign debt exposures; see Box 2.1).
The tensions were reflected in a further widening of yield spreads on sovereign debt within 
the euro area. During this period spreads reached an all-time high since the creation of the 
euro (close to 400 bp in the case of Spanish and Italian 10-year debt, although they fell 
subsequently, to stand at end-September at around 310 bp and 365 bp, respectively). The 
tensions spread to other markets, especially in Europe, but also in other developed and 
emerging economies (see Chart 1.1). Hence there was a rise in the credit risk premia on 
securities issued by financial institutions, whose share prices fell back and whose 
difficulties in obtaining funds on interbank markets – especially in dollars in the case of 
European banks – increased. The implied volatility of stock market indices rose, climbing 
in many cases to the levels of May 2010, when the Greek debt crisis broke. Overall, this 
shaped a complex setting for the wholesale funding of credit institutions.
Against this background, investors’ search for safe assets and the gloomier economic 
outlook prompted a decline in yields on long-term debt in several developed economies, 
in particular the United States and Germany, to historically low levels. Moreover, some 
currencies such as the Swiss franc and the yen also acted as safe-haven assets in this 
period. Indeed, the strong upward pressures on these currencies led the authorities in both 
countries to intervene on the foreign exchange markets and to approve exceptional 
measures to check the appreciation of their currencies. The developments in the euro area 
led to a depreciation of the euro against the dollar, sterling and numerous emerging-
In recent months 
the sovereign debt crisis 
has heightened, financial 
institutions’ difficulties in 
obtaining wholesale funding 
have increased and the world 
economic growth outlook 
has worsened
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economy currencies. As to commodities, Brent oil prices moved in a relatively narrow 
range (between $110 and $120 per barrel) despite the sustained political tension in various 
Middle East countries in a setting of relatively sluggish demand. Finally, gold also acted as 
a safe-haven asset and its price reached an all-time high close to $1,900 per ounce. 
More recently, the release of some less-negative-than-expected economic data in the 
United States coupled with some progress in resolving the European sovereign crisis 
prompted a partial reversal of the above-mentioned movements. This was reflected, among 
other aspects, in an increase in interest rates on high-quality long-term debt, a euro rally on 
foreign exchange markets and a fall-off in gold prices to close to $1,700 per ounce. 
Fiscal challenges have not been confined to Europe but are being faced in numerous 
developed economies. Thus, for instance, the US difficulties in negotiations on raising the 
debt ceiling and the downgrading of its debt by a credit rating agency in August adversely 
influenced the markets. And in Japan, the cost of reconstruction in the wake of the 
earthquake and nuclear crisis in March have exerted further pressure on public finances.
Activity slowed in the first half of the year in the developed economies and, in particular, data 
released as from Q2 proved especially weak. The diminished momentum of activity, which is 
expected to have run into Q3 according to the leading indicators available, reflects anticipated 
and non-anticipated factors. The former include most notably the structural fragilities in the 
Activity in the developed 
economies slowed in Q2 
and the growth outlook for 
2011 and 2012 has dimmed
SOURCES: Datastream, Reuters and Bloomberg.
a Euro area: 5-year iTraxx Europe Senior Financials. United States and United Kingdom: average 5-year CDS for commercial banks. Latest data: 14 October 2011.
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developed economies, the discontinuation of certain fiscal and monetary stimuli, and the 
inventory cycle. Among the non-anticipated factors are several negative supply-side shocks 
of a temporary nature (the Japanese earthquake and political problems in several oil-exporting 
countries that led to oil price rises) and the consequences of the financial turbulence. All told, 
the prospect of recovery in the developed economies is expected to be delayed, but not 
erased. The closing of the output gap is expected to be slow and not always smooth in a 
setting marked by a highly expansionary monetary policy, with certain new fiscal stimuli in the 
United States, even though a withdrawal of monetary and fiscal stimuli was projected some 
months back. The growth outlook for the industrialised economies has thus been revised 
downwards for 2011 and 2012 to around 2%, compared with the 3% increase recorded in 
2010. Moreover, the downside risks to growth increased significantly. In this setting of concern 
over the weakness of growth and of limited policy headroom, the markets have discounted 
that official interest rates in the main economies will hold at very low levels for a relatively 
lengthy period (in particular, any rise before 2013 in the United States has been discounted).
Meantime, the emerging economies have maintained high growth rates, although the pace 
of expansion has been diminishing, in line with the withdrawal of the monetary stimuli, the 
convergence towards potential growth rates and the lower growth of the developed 
economies. Indeed, the growth rate in these economies is expected to stand at around 
6.5% in 2011 and 2012 compared with 7.3% in 2010, with the dichotomy between their 
behaviour and that of the developed economies remaining in place. Turning to prices, 
inflation in the developed economies appears to be beginning to slow, while inflationary 
pressures (along with other signs of overheating such as the high expansion of credit or 
the rising trend of asset prices) remain in some emerging economies. Notwithstanding, the 
central banks of these economies have decided to halt the cycle of official interest rate 
rises and in some cases (Brazil and Turkey) they have even cut rates in light of the greater 
uncertainty over the international setting.
In the euro area, following a first quarter in which output expanded more than expected, 
economic activity slowed in Q2 as a result of the reversal of certain temporary factors that 
had boosted growth during the three previous months. Thus, GDP increased by 0.2% in 
Q2 in quarter-on-quarter terms and by 1.6% compared with the same period in 2010 (see 
Chart 1.2.A). The short- and medium-term outlook has deteriorated, as reflected by the 
downward revision of most analysts’ and international organisations’ projections, while 
downside risks have increased, linked above all to the persistence and worsening of 
tensions on financial markets. Specifically, the ECB’s September projections show GDP 
growth in a range of between 1.4% and 1.8% for 2011 and between 0.4% and 2.2% for 
2012, entailing lower rates in both cases than those in the March exercise.
In Spain, economic activity also slowed in 2011 Q2. GDP growth was 0.2% quarter-on-
quarter, compared with 0.4% in the three previous months, and 0.7% in year-on-year 
terms (see Chart 1.2.A). These developments were accompanied by continuing job 
destruction, albeit at a lesser pace (see Chart 1.2.B), placing the rate of decline in Q2 at 
0.9% in year-on-year terms, 0.3 pp less than in the previous quarter. The indicators 
available for Q3 point to slack activity.
The financial position of the private sector continues to be characterised by still-high debt 
ratios, although low interest-rate levels represent relief for the associated debt-service 
burden. The persistence of high unemployment rates tends to lessen the safety buffers 
available to indebted households to meet their obligations in this situation, while household 
wealth has continued declining as a result of the falls in property prices, which have 
At the same time, growth 
rates in the emerging 
economies remain high, 
albeit lower than in the 
preceding quarters
In the euro area, 
economic activity also 
slowed, the short- and 
medium-term growth 
outlook has deteriorated 
somewhat and downside 
risks have increased
In Spain, economic activity 
also slowed in Q2 and jobs 
continued to be destroyed, 
albeit at a lesser pace
Private-sector debt in Spain 
remains high, while household 
wealth has continued falling 
and the rise in business profits 
has slackened...
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steepened somewhat during the first half of the year, and of the declines in the value of 
financial assets. The information available on business profits (based on the data for the 
first half of the year from the sample of companies reporting to the quarterly Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office survey) shows a loss of momentum in ordinary profit.
General government debt has continued growing at a high though increasingly more 
moderate rate (15.4% in annual terms, in July). In combination with the sluggish growth of 
economic activity, this has continued translating into further increases in the debt/GDP 
ratio (65% of GDP in June) and in the debt-service burden (2.1% of GDP). 
In short, the latest developments on financial markets and the latest data available on the 
conjunctural situation in the national and international economy and on the financial 
position of the various sectors point to an increase in credit, market and liquidity risk. And 
this against a background of high uncertainty in which the likelihood of adverse events 
materialising in the short- and medium-term has increased. This more complex situation 
has resulted in the Kingdom of Spain’s credit rating being downgraded in the opening 
weeks of October. As is habitual following a sovereign downgrade, there will tend to be 
reductions in the rating of other securities – banks are a case in point – for which sovereign 
debt acts as a ceiling.
...and general government 
debt is slowing but continues 
to grow in terms of GDP
As a result, credit, market 
and liquidity risk have all risen
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2  DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER FINANCIAL 
MARKET PARTICIPANTS
Since the last Financial Stability Report (FSR) was published, the international financial 
markets have seen further bouts of tension and of withdrawal of investor confidence. The 
renewed uncertainties surrounding the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, their interaction 
with the banking sector and the doubts as to the growth capacity of the world economy 
(particularly the United States and Europe) make for a very difficult environment and have 
prompted the new agreements reached at the European summit of Heads of State or 
Government on 26 October (see Box 2.1).
Spanish deposit institutions, immersed in this adverse scenario, made significant advances 
in restructuring the savings bank sector to meet the recapitalisation requirements laid 
down by Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 (see Box 2.2).
The total consolidated assets1 of Spanish deposit institutions in June 2011 amounted to 
€3,82 billon (see Table 2.1).
Financing to the private sector (credit plus fixed income) at consolidated level decreased 
by 3% in June 2011 with respect to the same period of the previous year (see Table 2.1). 
This is explained both by the decrease in private-sector securities and by the performance 
of credit, which showed a negative year-on-year rate of change of 2% (see Table 2.1). This 
performance of credit is explained by uncertainty over the economy and, as a result, over 
the credit quality of bank customers, which has led to a tightening of lending standards. In 
addition, the closure of the primary fixed-income markets in recent months to European 
banks is having adverse effects on credit developments. On top of these supply-side 
factors come the weakness of demand in an economic environment like the present one 
and – a more structural factor – the need to adjust the excessive indebtedness of non-
financial firms and households.
Financing to general government (credit plus fixed income) at consolidated level 
grew by 14% in June 2011 with respect to June 2010 (see Table 2.1). This increase is 
sharper than that in December 2010, but lower than that of June 2010. In any event, its 
weight in the consolidated balance sheet of deposit-taking institutions is 10.6% (see 
Table 2.1).
The stress test results published last July show that Spanish banks’ exposure to the 
general government debt of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Italy amounts to 0.4% of total 
assets in December 2010 (see Chart 2.1.A). Spanish public debt held by Spanish 
institutions, which is naturally higher, has a relative weight of 6.9% in the sector’s 
consolidated balance sheet (see Chart 2.1.A). Taking the June 2011 figures for total 
Spanish deposit institutions in their business in Spain, it is seen that the financing 
granted by them to Spanish general government is concentrated (nearly two-thirds) in 
central government (see Chart 2.1.B).
2.1  Deposit institutions
2.1.1  BANKING RISK
Financing to the private sector 
continues to show negative 
rates of change
The weight in the balance 
sheet of the public debt of the 
euro area countries subject to 
greatest tension is 0.4%
1  Restructuring in 2010 reduced the number of banking groups, so that the first financial statements have updated 
starting balances. The consolidated balance sheets as at 30 June 2011 contain the aggregate figures of the 
banking groups at that date, which differ from those a year earlier. This should be taken into account also in 
analysing the consolidated income statements. In any event, these considerations should be taken into account 
when interpreting the figures in this FSR.
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BOX 2.1AGREEMENTS OF THE EURO AREA HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT AND OF THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON 21 JULY AND 26 OCTOBER
the design of a sufficiently comprehensive strategy to restore and 
strengthen the financial stability of the euro area. Although some 
details have yet to be resolved, the agreement addresses the main 
weaknesses identified and provides for ambitious action in four 
areas. First, headway has been made in the design of the second 
Greek financial aid programme, which moves further towards 
private-sector participation, with the objective of reducing 
government debt to around 120% of GDP in 2020. Second, 
arrangements are made to maximise efficiency in the use of EFSF 
funds, and procedures established to enable it to multiply its 
operating capacity by up to fivefold and thus act as an effective 
mechanism for halting contagion. For this purpose, two leverage 
options are considered which would not be mutually exclusive. 
The first consists of providing insurance or a partial guarantee for 
troubled Member States’ new sovereign bond issues. The second 
involves the creation of a financial vehicle to attract investment 
from private and public financial institutions. Furthermore, 
cooperation with the IMF will be strengthened so as to boost the 
capacity of the EFSF. Thirdly, a plan has been drawn up to restore 
confidence in the banking sector through, on one hand, an EU-
coordinated guarantee scheme for bank liabilities, to facilitate the 
medium and long-term funding of the sector, and, on the other, the 
recapitalisation of the principal banks, which will be required to 
have a Core Tier 1 capital ratio of 9% by June 2012. Lastly, the 
governments renewed the commitment to continue to adopt the 
necessary measures to ensure the sustainability of public finances 
and to encourage economic growth by observing approved fiscal 
targets and pushing through structural reforms.
The Heads of State or Government also agreed further advances in 
the reform of governance and integration in the euro area in order to 
enhance the economic convergence required within a monetary 
union. The euro area countries noted that the recent approval of the 
governance reform which began in 2010 was an important step in 
addressing some of the weaknesses detected in the institutional 
arrangements of the euro area. However, its definitive solution 
requires more resolute progress towards economic integration, 
which may require a limited reform of the Treaty on European Union.
As mentioned above, two agreements were reached on the 
banking sector: one on capital (establishing a mandatory capital 
buffer for banks) and another on term funding (in order to facilitate 
banks’ access to said funding). The ultimate aim of these measures 
is to restore confidence in the European banking sector. Both 
measures have been designed and coordinated by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA).
Under the European bank recapitalisation scheme approved, 
banks will have to maintain a temporary capital buffer. This capital 
buffer is a combination of two elements: the first is raising the 
minimum capital requirement to a Core Tier 1 ratio of 9%, as 
defined by the EBA; and the second is the valuation at market 
prices of general government debt instruments in accordance with 
the established methodology. 
In the opening months of 2011, the European economic authorities 
acknowledged the impossibility of refinancing Greek debt on the 
markets in mid-2012 as envisaged in the initial aid programme. 
The difficulty in designing a new aid programme and the 
controversy over the participation of private investors heightened 
tensions in the sovereign debt markets in June and July, which 
spread strongly to Spain and Italy. The magnitude of these 
challenges obliged the Heads of State or Government of the euro 
area to hold an extraordinary meeting on 21 July. This meeting 
reached significant decisions in two respects. First, it established 
the size and characteristics of a second financial aid programme 
for Greece. The programme, which will be implemented in concert 
with the IMF and with the voluntary participation of the private 
sector, envisaged a reduction of loan interest rates and a 
lengthening of maturities, and these improvements were also 
included in the programmes in place for Ireland and Portugal. It 
should be noted that the Heads of State or Government are 
committed to limiting private-sector participation solely to Greece, 
where the circumstances are exceptional. Meanwhile, the other 
euro area countries reaffirmed their determination to honour their 
sovereign debt and make the required fiscal and structural 
adjustments. Second, a significant reform was introduced to 
enhance the operational flexibility of the current EFSF, following 
the raising of its effective financing capacity to €440 billion in 
March. This reform will also apply to the future European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which will replace the EFSF in mid-2013. In 
particular, these mechanisms have the power to act pre-emptively 
and to finance the recapitalisation of the financial system by 
granting loans to governments, including those of countries not 
subject to the programme, and to intervene in secondary debt 
markets if an ECB analysis recognises the existence of exceptional 
circumstances posing a risk to financial stability. 
Despite these significant changes in the size and approach of the 
Greek aid programme and in the flexibility of the EFSF, debt market 
instability surged in the weeks following the decisions and spread 
strongly to Spain and Italy. This prompted the European Central 
Bank to reactivate its programme to purchase debt in the securities 
markets at the beginning of August. These operations helped to 
calm market tensions, although they did not prevent a fresh outbreak 
of turmoil in September. In the case of Greece, reform fatigue and the 
difficulties in pushing through the promised fiscal adjustment in an 
adverse macroeconomic setting, the evident reluctance by some 
governments to increase the aid and doubts as to the ultimate extent 
of private-sector participation continued to heighten uncertainty 
about the solvency of this economy. To add to these problems, a 
long time was taken to put into practice the decisions on the EFSF, 
which required parliamentary approval in some States, and there 
were criticisms that this fund was insufficient to deal with financial 
challenges on the scale that would arise if the most adverse 
scenarios materialised and it had to provide aid to larger economies.
In this respect, the summit of Heads of State or Government of the 
euro area countries held on 26 October saw significant headway in 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2011
RECUADRO ?TÍTULO RECUADRO
Total doubtful assets at consolidated level quickened to a year-on-year rate of 19% in June 
2011 (see Table 2.1). This growth rate is higher than in December 2010 (14% year-on-year). 
As a result of the increase in consolidated total doubtful assets, the consolidated total doubtful 
assets ratio has risen by 78 basic points (bp) since June 2010 to 4.55%.
The wholesale funding markets have been subject to tensions derived from the lack 
of investor confidence associated with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, 
which tended to intensify and spread to other countries in summer 2011. European 
financial institutions have found it difficult to access the primary markets, as have 
Spanish institutions. This is reflected in the behaviour of subordinated debt and 
of marketable securities, both of which recorded negative rates of change in June 2011 
(see Table 2.1)
In a context in which the euro area money markets have experienced a notable setback, 
the European central counterparty clearing houses have continued to play a significant 
complementary role as source of traditional interbank financing. This is reflected, in 
Table 2.1, in a sharp increase in the liability heading “Other”, which is typically residual, 
but now reflects the sharp increase in these operations through the central counterparty 
clearing houses.
The Eurosystem has continued to ensure access to short-term funding and, at the same 
time, given the difficulties of some European institutions in raising short-term dollar- 
denominated funding, has taken additional measures to provide short-term funds in that 
currency. The funds raised by Spanish institutions in the Eurosystem amounted, in net 
terms, to a daily average of €69,299 million in September. This amount, although high 
compared with previous months, is still far from the peak reached in summer 2010 (daily 
average of €131,891 million in July 2010), and represents 1.8% of the consolidated assets 
of deposit institutions as a whole (see Table 2.1). If the difficulties persist, Spanish 
institutions have collateral for accessing Eurosystem liquidity. 
Consolidated total 
doubtful assets grew 
by 19% in June 2011
The primary securities markets 
remained practically closed for 
European institutions
The Eurosystem has continued 
to ensure access to liquidity
Under the European agreement this new capital buffer must be in 
place by 30 June 2012 at the latest. Banks must detail their plans 
for meeting this requirement by the end of 2011, which must be 
agreed with national supervisors, the Banco de España in the case 
of Spain, and coordinated by the EBA. 
Finally, as mentioned above, the second element in the package of 
measures to restore confidence in the banking sector relates to the 
medium- and long-term debt issues of financial institutions. This is so 
European banks regain access to the primary markets for medium- 
and long-term instruments, to avoid credit restrictions operating 
through this channel next year. To this end, an EU-coordinated 
scheme is being designed to set up guarantees for issues by financial 
institutions. The EBA, ECB, European Commission and the European 
Investment Bank are committed to pressing ahead on this matter.
The capital needs published by the EBA on 27 October amount 
to €106,447 million for the group of banks considered in Europe. 
This is an estimate because it has been calculated on the basis 
of the data as at June 2011, although the amount of capital 
finally required to meet the criteria described above will be 
calculated taking the data as at September 2011. The EBA has 
published an estimate for Spanish banks of €26,161 million, 
which affects five banks. These banks have been respectively 
informed of the estimate. Their initial assessment is that they 
have the capacity to comply with the new requirements without 
the need for the public sector to take a stake in their capital. 
The Banco de España considers that these targets can plausibly 
be reached, and without prejudice to the banks submitting a 
detailed study of their specific plans to the Banco de España 
before year-end.
BOX 2.1AGREEMENTS OF THE EURO AREA HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT AND OF THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON 21 JULY AND 26 OCTOBER (cont’d)
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Credit to the resident private sector in Spain showed, on individual financial statement 
figures,2 a decrease of 2.8% in June 2011 with respect to the same period of the 
previous year (see Chart 2.2.A). The trend of the last few months has steepened. 
The slowdown in credit to the private sector is fairly general across institutions 
Credit to the resident private 
sector continues to show 
negative rates of change
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
b Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. Septembert 2011 data.
c Difference calculated in bp.
Jun-11
Change
Jun-11/Jun-10
Relative weight
Jun-10
Relative weight
Jun-11
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 136,244 24 2.9 3.6
Loans and advances to credit institutions 207,578 2 5.3 5.4
General government 99,992 18 2.2 2.6
Other private sectors 2,361,503 -2 62.5 61.8
Debt securities 507,123 -2 13.3 13.3
Other equity instruments 57,371 -9 1.6 1.5
Investments 52,062 9 1.2 1.4
Derivatives 155,917 -26 5.5 4.1
Tangible assets 53,618 8 1.3 1.4
Other (a) 187,723 16 4.2 4.9
TOTAL ASSETS 3,819,131 -1 100 100
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Financing to private sector 2,478,803 -3 66.2 64.9
Financing to general government 406,403 14 9.2 10.6
Total doubtful assets 144,407 19 3.1 3.8
Total doubtful assets ratio 4.55 77 (c)
Provisions for bad debts and country risk -84,321 13 -1.9 -2.2
Jun-11
Change
Jun-11/Jun-10
Relative weight
Jun-10
Relative weight
Jun-11
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 87,536 -49 4.5 2.3
Deposits from credit institutions 514,037 3 13.0 13.5
General government 98,020 9 2.3 2.6
Other private sectors 1,818,879 1 46.7 47.6
Marketable debt securities 550,260 -5 15.0 14.4
Derivatives 145,425 -22 4.8 3.8
Subordinated debt 97,181 -6 2.7 2.5
Provisions for pensions, tax and other 34,340 1 0.9 0.9
Other (a) 248,680 53 4.2 6.5
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,594,358 -1 94.1 94.1
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Eurosystem net lending (b) 69,299 3.3 1.8
Minority interests 17,599 23 0.4 0.5
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity -8,152 n.s. -0.1 -0.2
Own funds 215,327 -1 5.6 5.6
TOTAL EQUITY 224,773 -2 5.9 5.9
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,819,131 -1 100 100
Assets
Liabilities and equity
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET. 
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS 
TABLE 2.1
2  The FSR uses consolidated data, which include the foreign operations of Spanish institutions through their 
subsidiaries, but it also uses other data drawn from individual balance sheets. The latter, the use of which is 
indicated in the text and in charts (by the abbreviation ID), allow us to focus our analysis on the risks associated 
with the behaviour of the Spanish economy and to offer a more detailed analysis due to the greater information 
available.
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and, at the same time, the degree of dispersion between them has increased (see 
Chart 2.2.B).These credit developments reflect a lower supply of credit, because the economic 
uncertainty has caused institutions to tighten their lending standards and because the 
primary fixed-income markets have been closed in recent months to European institutions.
€m % total assets
Greece 448 0.01
Ireland 79 0
Italy 7,408 0.22
Portugal 5,492 0.16
Spain 231,696 6.91
SOURCES: EBA stress tests and Banco de España.
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The difficult economic environment also weakens demand, resulting in the necessary 
correction of private sector indebtedness following its notable increase during the 
prolonged period of economic growth and credit expansion in Spain prior to the crisis.
The fall in credit to the resident private sector is also across the board in the various 
sectors of activity, although significant differences between them persist (see Chart 2.2.A). 
Thus lending to individuals decreased in June 2011 by 1.9%, and the fall was concentrated 
mainly in lending for purposes other than house purchase, where negative year-on-year 
Although the downward trend 
in credit is across the board, 
differences remain between 
the various sectors of activity...
The situation of the restructuring process when this period expired 
can be summarised as follows:
 –  Two savings banks (Bankia and Banca Cívica) successfully 
completed their IPOs in July, raising the necessary capital 
(€3.09 billion and €600 million) to allow them to comfortably 
exceed the 8% level of core capital (9.2% and 9.7% 
respectively).
 –  Two institutions had an extension of 25 days to reach the 
required level of core capital. During this period they 
resolved the situation as follows: Liberbank opted to 
generate the necessary capital internally and BMN issued 
€242 million of convertible instruments with voting rights.
 –  CEISS has agreed to merge with Unicaja, without needing 
assistance from the FROB since the resulting institution will 
have a core capital ratio of more than 10%.
 –  As regards institutions that were basically going to depend 
on FROB funds, it is worth mentioning that:
 –  CAM, at the request of its board of directors was 
taken under the control of the Banco de España. As a 
consequence, the FROB was appointed a director of 
the new institution, which is being restructured with a 
view to its sale through a competitive bidding process. 
For this purpose the FROB agreed to inject €2.8 billion 
of capital, and to provide a €3 billion liquidity facility.
 –  The other three institutions (CatalunyaCaixa, Nova-
CaixaGalicia and Unnim) have received funds from the 
FROB, to increase their core capital to more than 10%, 
totalling €4.75 billion (€1.72 billion, €2.47 billion and €568 
million, respectively). According to the assessments 
made by the experts independently appointed by the 
FROB, the latter has become the majority shareholder 
in these three institutions (holding 100% of the capital 
in the case of Unnim).
Thus, the process of recapitalising credit institutions that had a 
shortfall of core capital when the new solvency obligations 
introduced by Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 of 18 February 2011 
entered into force is being completed, with the contribution of 
€7.55 billion of funds from the FROB. 
Since publication of the last edition of this report, the process of 
restructuring the savings bank sector, in order to comply with the 
requirements of Royal Decree-Law 2/2011, has speeded up. 
This Royal Decree-Law (RD-L) raised the solvency requirements 
for credit institutions in two ways:
 –  By creating a new capital requirement based on the concept 
of “core capital” contained in the new Basel III capital 
accord, which includes the higher quality elements of 
capital.  
 –  By increasing the required levels of solvency to 8% for core 
capital for all institutions, a percentage that rises to 10% in 
certain specific cases. 
By applying this legislation, the Banco de España identified a group 
of banks that did not initially meet the core capital requirements. 
These were required to submit strategic plans for meeting the 
required level of solvency before 30 September 2011. 13 institutions 
were identified, 9 of which were savings banks, and they chose 
various recapitalisation strategies, which are summarised as 
follows:
 –  Four groups of savings banks (Bankia, Cívica, BMN and 
Liberbank) decided to propose a private solution as their 
preferred option to cover their initial shortfall, either through 
IPOs or through the incorporation of external investors. 
 –  One savings bank (CEISS) decided to undertake an 
integration process with another institution that had excess 
core capital, so that in the consolidated accounts for both 
institutions the shortfall initially incurred by the former 
could be offset. 
 –  Four savings banks (Catalunya Caixa, Unnim, Nova Caixa 
Galicia and CAM) decided that they preferred to receive 
greater or lesser amounts of funds from the Fund for the 
Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector, which would 
again act as capital supplier of last resort. 
All these strategies were supposed to be introduced before 
30 September, although RD-L 2/2011 had envisaged that the 
Banco de España could grant extensions when certain conditions 
were met. 
BOX 2.2RESTRUCTURING OF THE SAVINGS BANKS SECTOR: THE RECAPITALISATION OF ROYAL DECREE-LAW 2/2011
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rates of change of 7% were reached. Lending to individuals for house purchase in June 
2011 showed a slightly negative rate of change, after positive rates in previous quarters, 
which in 2010 were at least partly attributable to the increase in demand derived from the 
bringing-forward of purchase decisions to the end of that year for tax reasons. 
Credit to non-financial corporations exhibits, within the general pattern of decline in this 
variable, persistent notable differences between that to construction and real estate 
development firms and that to other firms. The former shows negative rates of change 
which reach 7.2%, continuing a process which began in early 2009 (see Chart 2.2.A).
Credit to other non-financial corporations returned to negative rates of change similar to 
those seen in December 2009, posting a year-on-year fall of 2.3% in June 2011. If firm size 
is approximated by the volume of bank debt they report to the Banco de España Central 
Credit Register, and the degree of dependence of each firm on this type of financing is 
ignored, it is observed that the reduction in credit to other non-financial corporations also 
extends across all size classes (see Chart 2.2.C). The doubtful assets ratio, except for 
larger firms, is also similar across firms of different size classes (see Chart 2.2.D).
Doubtful assets arising from credit to the resident private sector in business in Spain rose 
by 24.9% in June 2011 with respect to June 2010. The upturn in the growth of doubtful 
assets is explained by that derived from credit to construction and real estate development 
firms (see Charts 2.3.A and B). For other non-financial firms the rate of increase (13.8% in 
June 2011) is lower than in June 2010 (30%), while for households, both in home loans and 
in other credit, the rates of change in June 2010 remain negative, as in recent quarters 
(-3.1% and -10.1%, respectively).
The increase in doubtful assets and the negative rates of change of credit explain the 
rise in the doubtful assets ratio of the resident private sector in business in Spain (see 
Chart 2.3.C), which was up by 6.8% in June 2011 (7.2% in August 2011, the latest 
available figure). This increase in the doubtful assets ratio is across-the-board in deposit 
institutions (see Chart 2.3.D). The sluggishness of the economy and the persistence of 
problems in the economic and financial arena might result in additional rises in the 
doubtful assets ratio.
Sectoral analysis shows that the doubtful assets ratio for households (3% in June 2011) 
has held basically steady in the past twelve months, dropping slightly in loans for house 
purchase (2.44% in June 2011, against 2.5% a year earlier) and in loans for other purposes 
(5.9% in June 2011, against 6.1% in June 2010).
For non-financial corporations the doubtful loans ratio increased slightly in lending to 
companies other than construction and real estate development firms (5% in June 2011 
against 4.3% in June 2010) and significantly more sharply in lending to construction and 
real estate development firms, for which the doubtful loans ratio in June 2011 stood at 
17.1% (10.9% a year earlier).
At a time of marked adjustment in the real estate sector, the banking sector’s troubled 
exposure is not limited to doubtful assets. Account must also be taken of foreclosed 
assets, assets received in satisfaction of debt and standard loans under surveillance.3 
…and not so much based on 
company size approximated 
by volume of bank debt
The higher rate of increase 
of doubtful assets is linked 
to construction and real estate 
development loans
The doubtful assets ratio of 
the resident private sector in 
business in Spain has 
increased…
… this development being 
concentrated in construction 
and real estate development 
loans
3  Loans current in payment but showing some weakness associated with the transaction itself or with a certain 
sector or group of borrowers.
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The assets so classified, along with those considered to be doubtful, are subject to 
provisioning in accordance with the accounting rules of the Banco de España.
Moreover, the Banco de España has also required Spanish credit institutions to publish 
this information in detail. They must disclose it in their annual accounts and in any interim 
financial information they may make public.
Based on this interim information,4 the data relating to June 2011 indicate that the troubled 
exposure (doubtful assets, foreclosures and standard loans under surveillance) linked to 
real estate development amounts, for commercial banks and savings banks,5 to €176 billon, 
i.e. 52% of the total exposure to real estate development. This volume of troubled exposure 
represents 11.4% of the credit portfolio (credit to the resident private sector in business in 
Spain, including, for this purpose, foreclosed assets) and 5.2% of consolidated assets 
(see Chart 2.4.A).
The potentially troubled 
exposure to the real estate 
development sector 
represents 11.4% of the credit 
portfolio…
-10 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
Jun-07 Dec-07 Jun-08 Dec-08 Jun-09 Dec-09 Jun-10 Dec-10 Jun-11 
 OTHER CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR 
 CONSTRUCTION AND PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT 
B.  YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE IN DOUBTFUL ASSETS 
€ bn  
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
Dec-08 Jun-09 Dec-09 Jun-10 Dec-10 Jun-11 
 TOTAL DOUBTFUL ASSETS 
 CONSTRUCTION AND PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT 
 TOTAL DOUBTFUL ASSETS, EXCL. CONSTR. AND PROP. DVPT 
A.  DOUBTFUL ASSETS OF CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR  
€ bn  
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
DOUBTFUL ASSETS OF THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR. BUSINESS IN SPAIN, ID. DEPOSIT
INSTITUTIONS  
 
 
CHART 2.3
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
0 5 10 15 
 JUNE 2011 
 DECEMBER 2010 
 JUNE 2010 
D.   DISTRIBUTION OF CREDIT BASED ON ATTENDANT DOUBTFUL 
ASSETS RATIO (%)
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
Mar-06 Dec-06 Sep-07 Jun-08 Mar-09 Dec-09 Sep-10 Jun-11 
 DOUBTFUL ASSETS RATIO  
 CONSTRUCTION AND PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT 
 NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, EXCL. CONSTR. AND PROP. DVPT 
 HOUSING 
HOUSEHOLDS EXCL. HOUSING
 
C.  DOUBTFUL ASSETS RATIO   
% 
4  The information reflected in the FSR may differ to some extent from that published by institutions because the 
former includes credit drawn down, financial guarantees and 50% of undrawn credit. In the case of foreclosed real 
estate, the FSR states the book value of the credit immediately before the foreclosure or acquisition. Note also 
that, as explained on various occasions, the total of the exposure is based on the credit purpose criterion and thus 
does not coincide with the amount of credit for construction and real estate development stated in the Boletín 
Estadístico under the criterion of principle activity of the firm. Thus, for example, financing to large Spanish 
construction companies for the performance of other services or for large-scale infrastructure construction is not 
reflected in the figures reported in this FSR.
5  The figure relates to the institutions subjected to EBA stress testing in July.
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Coverage by provisions (specific provisions associated solely with these assets and general 
provisions for business in Spain) amounts to 33% of the troubled exposure in June 2011. 
This level of coverage of real estate development risk exposure means that the hypothetical 
losses under the baseline scenario of the European stress tests conducted by the EBA 
would be more than covered (see Box 2.3 on these tests). Under the adverse scenario, the 
probability of occurrence of which is very low, 88% of the hypothetical losses on real estate 
development and foreclosed loans would be covered by provisions already in place (those 
for real estate development loans and the general provision for business in Spain) (see 
Chart 2.4.B). Under the baseline stress scenario this coverage would exceed 120%.
The total balance sheet write-offs by Spanish institutions since the commencement of financial 
system restructuring until June 2011 amount to €105 billon, equivalent to around 10% of GDP.
The international financial markets reflect renewed and more serious bouts of tension and 
risk aversion. This is a consequence of the exacerbation and spread of the euro area public 
debt crisis (see Charts 2.5.A and B) and of its interrelationship with the banking sector. 
… and the coverage 
by provisions already in 
place is 33%
The financial markets have 
reflected new and more 
serious bouts of tension…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Includes all institutions that participated in the EBA stress tests.
b Specijc provisions associated with real estate developer risk and general provisions of business in Spain.
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The results of the 2011-2012 stress tests conducted at EU level 
were published on 15 July. The testing was coordinated by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) acting in concert with the 
European Commission and the ECB and was carried out in 21 EU 
countries on a total of 91 credit institutions. The methodology of 
these tests is based on that which was used, also at the European 
level, in 2010. However, in order to overcome the doubts that 
arose barely a few months after the publication of the results of 
the 2010 exercise, and also because of the tensions relating to 
the European sovereign debt crisis, the 2011 tests incorporate 
significant changes. Four aspects should be noted: (1) the stricter 
methodology; (2) the higher level of capital – and its greater 
quality – following the stress; (3) the unprecedented degree of 
transparency; and (4) the intense process of review and 
homogenisation by the EBA.
As in the previous year, the Spanish banking sector was subjected to 
testing which was characterised by total transparency, since it 
included all Spanish savings banks and listed commercial banks. 
This signified a coverage of 93% of the system, well above the 50% 
required by the EBA. Moreover, the commitment to transparency 
was met by publishing additional information. This additional 
information included a breakdown of hypothetical gross impairment 
losses by portfolio, presenting separately mortgage risk and real 
estate development risk.
The stress testing methodology used this year is stricter than in 
2010, particularly regarding the cost of bank funding and minimum 
capital requirements. As regards the former, banks have had to 
face sharply higher funding costs due to the upward shift in the 
interbank rate curve and the pass-through of the increase in the 
sovereign spread. Regarding capital requirements, the minimum 
was set at 5% Core Tier 1 (CT1), much higher than the current core 
capital requirements in the European Union (2%) and than those of 
Basel III in the year of its entry into force (4.5%), which moreover 
do not include items with a high capacity to absorb losses (such 
as, for example, mandatory convertible debt).
The stress test period starts at the end of the 2010 accounting 
year. Impairment losses arising thereafter under a stressed 
scenario are calculated for the two-year period of 2011-2012 
under the two scenarios designed for European testing: baseline 
and adverse.
Specifically, the adverse scenario is that in which Spanish GDP 
falls by 1% in 2011 and a further 1.1% in 2012. The probability of 
occurrence of the adverse scenario in Spain is lower than 0.5% in 
both years. The scenarios applied for Spain were also more severe 
than the European average in respect of real estate price behaviour, 
increase in risk premium and fall of the main stock market indices.
The information presented by the Banco de España, both bank by 
bank and grouping by grouping, included a breakdown of the 
hypothetical gross impairment losses in the main credit portfolios, 
detailing the items which absorb those losses up to the final 
impact on CT1. Additionally, results were presented which took 
into account other loss-absorbing items, paying special attention 
to general provisions. For the aggregate of the total system under 
the stressed adverse scenario, the main results, which show the 
solidness of the Spanish banking sector, are summarised below:
 –  The hypothetical asset impairment losses which would 
arise in 2011 and 2012 would amount to €168,811 million, 
representing 5.4% of total assets (6.5% for savings banks).
  The most significant source of these impairment losses 
was the credit portfolio, with €159,176 million, and, within 
it, the real estate development portfolio (€65,900 million, 
39% of total credit risk impairment losses).
 –  Accumulated specific provisions would be able to absorb 
39% of that impairment, while the generation of funds 
would serve to absorb an additional 47% (13% in savings 
banks and 90% in internationally active banks), even 
assuming a decrease in average net operating income with 
respect to 2010 (particularly severe, at 49%, in savings 
banks, which must be added to that of 40% already 
recorded in 2010).
 –  The CT1 at December 2010 was €139,863 million for total 
banks, giving a ratio of 7.4% (7.3% for savings banks). 
Stressed CT1 own funds at December 2012 would drop to 
€130,063 million (ratio of 6.5%) for total banks and to 
€33,727 million (ratio of 4.2%) for savings banks. On 
aggregating the €14,471 million of capital under Royal 
Decree-Law 2/2011 and the 2011 capital increases, 
stressed CT1 would rise to €144,534 million (ratio of 7.3%) 
for total banks and to €47,651 million for savings banks 
(ratio of 5.9%), which confirms the effectiveness of Royal 
Decree-Law 2/2011 for the solvency of Spanish banks.
 –  Under the adverse scenario, five Spanish banks would not 
initially meet the minimum capital threshold of 5% and 
would need additional capital of €1,563 million. However, if 
the €17,573 million of general provisions at December 
2010 are taken into account, only one Spanish bank would 
initially lie below this threshold (CT1 ratio of 8.1%). If, in 
addition, the €5,147 million of compulsory convertible debt 
is taken into account, no Spanish bank would lie below 
this CT1 ratio of 5%, obviating the need to adopt additional 
support measures. Finally, after taking into account the 
other loss-absorbing items, the final CT1 ratio for total 
Spanish banks would stand at 8.6%.
The stress tests show that no Spanish bank needs to increase its 
capital thanks to the loss-absorbing items envisaged in our 
financial system, such as general provisions and compulsory 
convertible debt. If these funds are subtracted from bank balance 
BOX 2.3STRESS TESTS FOR SPANISH COMMERCIAL BANKS AND SAVINGS BANKS
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sheets, five Spanish banks would not meet the minimum Core Tier 
1 requirement of 5% set for these tests. The results are consistent 
with the analysis and the actions taken in the process of Spanish 
credit institution restructuring. The bank recapitalisation required 
by Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 was the last step in the restructuring 
process initiated three years ago in Spain, which has allowed 
balance sheets to be cleaned up, banks to undergo a concentration 
process, the corporate model to be changed through the transfer 
of nearly all savings bank activity to commercial banks, and 
corporate governance to be improved.
The negative growth outlook in different areas, including Europe and the USA, also 
contributes negatively to a very difficult environment in which European and Spanish credit 
institutions have to operate.
These factors have shaped a scenario in which, from summer to the present, issuances by 
euro area financial institutions have been scant. The medium- and long-term wholesale 
funding markets, even for collateralised securities like covered bonds, have remained 
practically closed. In this difficult environment Spanish deposit institutions have not issued 
securities in the medium- and long-term wholesale markets. Although the maturities of 
wholesale funds are relatively evenly spaced over the next few years (see Chart 2.6.A), the 
persistence of the financial market difficulties is a cause for concern in the Spanish banking 
sector.
Short-term funding has been subject to renewed tension. Short-term dollar-denominated 
funding has recently come under pressure, as a result of structural changes to US money 
market funds and the scant appetite for European risk in the US market. This pressure has 
adversely affected the European institutions most exposed to this type of funding and, 
indeed, prompted action by the European Central Bank in concert with other monetary 
authorities to palliate these tensions (see Box 2.4). This situation has not affected Spanish 
institutions, since their dependence on this market was already very limited.
The euro area money markets also fell notably. This is evidenced by the Eonia trading volumes 
which, after recovering in the third quarter of 2010, have seen a particularly sharp drop in the 
average amount traded since the second quarter of the year (see Chart 2.6.B). In the Spanish 
market, although the unsecured segment of the interbank market (that most affected by the 
crisis) also suffered a slight setback at the end of 2010, the first quarter saw a significant 
recovery which, however, lost steam in the second quarter and worsened still further in the 
third quarter. Thus, while average daily trading in this segment was €5,280 million in the first 
quarter of 2011, in mid-September the average recorded for the third quarter (before it had 
ended) was €3,527 million. The repo segment continued to hold fairly steady, with slight 
variations due to the transfer of activity from the unsecured segment. In this respect it should 
be noted that European central counterparty clearing houses have continued to play a 
significant role as an alternative source of interbank financing to the traditional market.
Simultaneously with the greater difficulty in raising funds on the euro area money markets, 
there was an increase in total recourse to Eurosystem liquidity (see Chart 2.6.C). For 
Spanish institutions this meant that from end-February to end-September 2011 the 
institutions resident in Spain raised their gross recourse to the Eurosystem by €31,280 
million (up 64%), while the outstanding balance in the Eurosystem as a whole increased by 
€145,995 million (up 33%, see Chart 2.6.C).
… with the primary wholesale 
funding markets practically 
closing in Europe
Short-term funding has also 
been subject to renewed 
tension...
… which is reflected in 
the increased recourse to 
Eurosystem financing,…
BOX 2.3STRESS TESTS FOR SPANISH COMMERCIAL BANKS AND SAVINGS BANKS (cont’d)
Against the background of renewed tensions on European financial 
markets due to the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis, the 
Eurosystem has adopted various measures in recent months aimed 
at facilitating European credit institutions’ access to funding. The 
measures include most notably those stated below.
First, the Eurosystem has maintained the use of the fixed-rate full 
allotment procedure both for the main refinancing operations 
(MROs) and for maintenance period operations. Further, financing 
operations with a maturity of three months have continued to be 
conducted under the fixed-rate full allotment arrangement, where 
the rate is the average rate of MROs over the life of the respective 
three-month operation. In August, the Eurosystem conducted a 
supplementary six-month operation (this had not been done since 
May 2010), and in October it announced two supplementary 
operations with maturities of 12 and 13 months, to be conducted 
in October and December 2011, respectively (the last 12-month 
operation was in December 2009). These three supplementary 
operations follow the fixed-rate full allotment procedure, taking the 
average rate on MROs over the life of the operation as their rate.
The ECB Governing Council decided in August to reactivate its 
Securities Market Programme, in force since May 2010. Moreover, 
in October it announced the start of a second covered bond 
purchase programme for €40 billion, which will run from November 
2011 to October 2012.
Foreign-currency liquidity provision measures have also been 
taken. In June it was decided to extend the swap line agreement 
with the Federal Reserve, due to end in August 2011, to August 
2012. One-week US dollar liquidity-providing operations in 
dollars, conducted through fixed-rate full allotment, would also 
be continued. Also extended in August was the swap line 
agreement with the Bank of England, to September 2012 (it was 
scheduled to run to September 2011). Further, on top of the 
weekly operations, three additional three-month US dollar 
liquidity-providing operations were announced in September. 
These operations will take place in October, November and 
December 2011 using the fixed-rate full allotment procedure.
BOX 2.4RECENT EUROSYSTEM MEASURES
As a result, the gross lending to Spanish institutions, expressed as a percentage of the 
Eurosystem total, increased in this period. Chart 2.6.D shows the amount granted to 
institutions resident in Spain relative to the total provided by the Eurosystem. As can be seen, 
the percentage allotted in tenders to institutions resident in Spain increased with respect to 
the low amounts of the first quarter of 2011, although it remains well below the highest levels 
recorded in summer 2010. Compared with the average of 11% for February 2011, the figure 
in September was 15%, while the maximum of 23% was reached in July 2010.
For reasons of current juncture (market difficulties) and of a more structural nature (relative 
importance of wholesale funding in bank balance sheets), deposit institutions are changing 
their liability-side structure. This leads to greater recourse to retail deposits, which for 
Spanish institutions are showing continuous positive year-on-year rates of change despite 
the difficult times which the Spanish economy is going through (see Chart 2.7.A). The 
ongoing expansion of deposits taken from non-financial corporations and households 
contrasts with the notable slowdown, and in recent quarters, fall, in credit to these sectors. 
As a result, the difference between the rates of deposits and credit growth has turned 
positive (deposits are increasing more quickly than loans) from mid-2008 to the present (see 
Chart 2.7.B). This performance of deposits and the decrease in credit, together with 
divestments of other assets, diminish the need for rolling over wholesale funds. The available 
information indicates that this roll-over requirement has decreased by around 50%.
These changes in the composition of the liabilities of deposit institutions have brought a 
notable increase in competition between institutions to attract time deposits. The resulting 
higher rates offered for new deposits have edged above EURIBOR and, although passed 
through only gradually to average rates (and thus to the net interest margin), are putting 
more pressure on income statements. This additional pressure, although a product of the 
heightened competition to attract retail saving, also reflects the wholesale funding conditions 
of financial markets that are not functioning normally. 
…, which in Spanish 
institutions also rose, but by 
much less than in July 2010
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In this respect, the first final provision of Royal Decree 771/2011 establishes a system of 
contributions to deposit guarantee funds which, in line with the work of the European 
Commission, links the institutions’ contributions to the risk they assume. Thus, the Royal 
Decree requires additional contributions to deposit guarantee funds compulsory by 
institutions which remunerate time deposits or settle sight accounts above certain rates of 
interest. This reform has also helped to moderate the excessively aggressive commercial 
policies pursued by some institutions.
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From January to June 2011 Spanish deposit institutions recorded consolidated income 
attributable to the controlling entity of €7,835 million (see Table 2.2). In terms of average 
total assets (ATA), at 0.44% this was 13 bp lower than in June 2010. The return on equity 
(ROE) was 7.4%, which was also lower than in the same period of the previous year 
(9.5%). This fall particularly affected institutions with higher returns, but not those with a 
relatively lower ROE (left-hand part of the function depicted in Chart 2.8.A).
The profitability of the banking sector is under pressure. The fall in profit before tax 
between June 2010 (0.77% of ATA) and June 2011 (0.57%) is basically explained by two 
factors: first, the reduction in net interest income; and second, the continued high level of 
asset impairment losses, reflecting specific provisions (see Chart 2.8.B).
The growth of financial costs (33.1% between June 2011 and June 2010) was more 
pronounced than the increase in financial revenue (9.8% over the same period), which 
resulted in a fall in net interest income of 7.9% in absolute terms (see Table 2.2). The 
decline in net interest income is sharper if Spanish banks with high levels of international 
activity are excluded from the analysis (1.1% of ATA in June 2011 and 1.3% in June 2010). 
 The gradual reduction in the net interest spread (difference between the average return on 
assets and the average cost of liabilities; see Chart 2.9.A) is putting downward pressure on 
net interest income, although the downward trend in the net interest spread on new business 
seems to have reversed in recent months. Should this development persist, it would be 
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY
Negative pressures on 
profitability persist
Net interest income is falling
Jun-10 Jun-11
€m
% Change
Jun-11/Jun-10 % ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 65,613 9.8 3.36 3.66
Financial costs 34,433 33.1 1.46 1.92
Net interest income 31,179 -7.9 1.91 1.74
Return from capital instruments 1,435 -5.1 0.09 0.08
Share of projt or loss of entities accounted for using 
the equity method
2,385 37.2 0.10 0.13
Net commissions 11,899 5.5 0.63 0.66
Gains and losses on jnancial assets and liabilities 4,068 -31.8 0.34 0.23
Other operating income -426 n.s. -0.01 -0.02
Gross income 50,541 -6.8 3.05 2.82
Operating expenses 24,982 4.9 1.34 1.39
Net operating income 25,559 -15.9 1.71 1.43
Asset impairment losses (specijc and general provisions) 12,204 -19.7 0.86 0.68
Provisioning expense (net) 2,247 72.1 0.07 0.13
Operating projt 11,108 -20.1 0.78 0.62
Asset impairment losses (assets other than loans and credits) 2,548 40.5 0.10 0.14
Income from disposals (net) 1,699 11.1 0.09 0.09
PrNjt before tax 10,260 -24.6 0.77 0.57
Net income 8,891 -19.9 0.62 0.50
MEMORANDUM ITEM
    Income attributable to the controlling entity 7,835 -22.0 0.57 0.44
Jun-11
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS. JANUARY-JUNE 2011 
TABLE 2.2
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passed through to the average net interest spread (see Chart 2.9.B). However, the ability to 
pass higher borrowing costs through to lending rates is limited, although this helps to 
contain the increase in the doubtful assets ratio. In the next few months the negative 
pressures on net interest income, stemming from the developments in financial costs and 
from the continued high volume of non-interest earning doubtful assets, will persist.6
The growth of commissions (5.5% between June 2010 and June 2011; see Table 2.2), 
basically stemming from those for collection and payment services, and from the sale of 
non-banking financial products, did not fully offset the reduction in gains and losses on 
financial assets and liabilities (-31.8% in the reference period). Accordingly, the fall in net 
interest income was passed through to gross income.
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jnancial corporations, while 
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6  Also, assets foreclosed in settlement of debts generate maintenance and management costs that have an 
adverse impact on the income statement, in addition to the fact that they do not generate any financial income.
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Operating expenses increased by 4.9% between June 2010 and June 2011. This rate of 
increase, which may appear to be high, is partly explained by changes in the scope of 
consolidation and by exchange rate developments, which affect institutions with a 
significant international presence. For their part, those savings banks involved in 
restructuring processes, recorded a 5.5% fall in operating expenses between June 2010 
and June 2011. In line with this, in the case of business in Spain, the number of offices and 
of employees have been falling continuously since late 2009 (see panels A and B of Chart 
2.10), both variables having returned to similar levels to those existing in late 2005.
In any case, given the pressures on the ability to generate net interest income, which will 
probably persist, and the continued high level of asset impairment losses, institutions 
will have to persevere in reducing their overhead costs. Indeed, impairment losses on 
financial assets (specific provisions) and those associated with other assets (largely 
reflecting provisions for foreclosed assets and dations in payment of debts) continue to 
absorb a significant portion of the net operating income of deposit institutions. Although 
these provisions declined relative to June 2011, largely because in December 2010 
provisions charged to reserves were made in various integration projects, which may affect 
the comparison in the flow of asset impairment losses, the fall in net operating income 
more than offset this decline. As a result, asset impairment losses deducted 57.9% in June 
2011, as against 56% in June 2010 (see Chart 2.10.C).
In the next few quarters the volume of asset impairment losses can be expected to 
remain high. This, along with the foreseeable adverse trend in net interest income, 
constitutes a difficult scenario for the income statement of Spanish banks.
Asset impairment losses 
remain high
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The viability of Spanish banks’ business model helps to mitigate those elements that are 
having a negative effect on the income statement. Thus, the ratio between the market 
value and book value of Spanish banks compares favourably with that in other banking 
sectors (see Charts 2.11.A and B). That said, the trend in the market prices of financial 
institutions is downward, which is reflected in reductions in the ratio between the market 
value and book value of banks (see panels A and B of Chart 2.11). In a context 
characterised by the instability of European securities markets, especially in their 
financial segments, various European authorities, including the CNMV, banned 
transactions in securities or financial instruments that involved establishing or increasing 
net short positions in financial sector shares.
The overall solvency ratio was 19  bp higher in June 2011 than a year earlier and stood at 
12%.7 The Tier 1 ratio was 94 bp higher, at 10% (see Chart 2.12.A). Meanwhile,
the core capital ratio, defined as capital plus reserves, less goodwill, stood at 8.5% in June 
2011 (8% in June 2010). The increase in the Tier 1 ratio was a widespread phenomenon 
among deposit institutions (see Chart 2.12.B).
The increase in the overall solvency ratio occurred in spite of the fall in total own funds 
(which occurred due to the sharp reduction in lower quality Tier 2 capital, and in spite of 
the increase in Tier 1 capital), and as a consequence of the decline in risk-weighted 
assets.
Risk-weighted assets, the denominator of the solvency ratio, decreased by 5.6% in June 
2011 (see Chart 2.13.A). In line with the lower lending activity in the period, credit risk 
requirements, with a weight of 88% in the total, fell by 5.5%. Requirements for operational 
risk (with a weight of 9%) slowed by almost 9 pp to a rate of increase of 1.2%, while those 
arising from price and exchange-rate risk (2% weight) fell by 27.2%.
Total own funds fell by 4.1% in June 2011 relative to the same period of the previous 
year (see Chart 2.13.B). This reduction is explained by the sharp contraction in Tier 2 
2.1.3 SOLVENCY
The solvency of Spanish 
deposit institutions has 
improved
Risk-weighted assets have 
declined …
… and Tier 1 capital has 
increased
SOURCE: Datastream.
a Each pair of bars represents an institution. Latest data: 14 October 2011.
b Each bar represents an institution. Latest data: 14 October 2011.
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SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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capital (26.7%) and conceals an improvement in the overall quality of own funds, since 
Tier 1 capital continued to grow (4.2%).
Tier 1 capital – the highest quality own funds – continued to grow in June 2011 thanks to 
the sharp increase in capital, which accelerated by 23.6 pp from a rate of 2.6%, offsetting 
the reduction in reserves and intangible assets, the growth of the latter being less forceful 
than in June 2010 (see Chart 2.13.C). The increase in capital, and the reduction in reserves, 
is largely explained by the restructuring processes, which have involved the restructuring of 
balance sheets (and a decline in reserves), while the transfer of the activity of savings banks 
to commercial banks also increased capital and (further) reduced reserves.
Tier 2 capital fell more sharply than in the previous year (26.7%), as a result of a fall in all 
its components (see Chart 2.13.D). 
The capital ratio of large Spanish institutions stands in a medium-low position in relation 
to other comparable European institutions (see Chart 2.14.A). However, the other European 
institutions record lower risk-weighted assets, discernible on account of the lower weight 
European institutions show a 
high level of dispersion in their 
leverage ratios
SOURCE: Financial reports of the banks in question.
a The two biggest banks in Spain, France, Italy, Germany and Switzerland are taken. Each panel depicts the banks in descending order for the variable in question.
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of the latter in total assets (see Chart 2.14.B). In this situation, a recent initiative of the 
Basel Committee to analyse the consistency of assets in terms of risk at the international 
level, is especially significant. European institutions also show a high level of dispersion in 
their leverage ratios (inverse relationship between accounting own funds and total assets; 
see Chart 2.14.C).
The insurance sector is also going through a period of heightened risk, while from a 
medium-term perspective, the application of Solvency II is an important challenge for the 
companies. More immediate elements of pressure include the adverse economic situation, 
which affects those sectors whose earnings are more cyclically dependent, and others in 
which the volume of activity may be affected. 
The situation on stock markets, which have been moving downwards, adversely affects 
the equity holdings of insurance companies. In the Spanish case, the relatively low weight 
of equities on the balance sheets of insurance companies means that this is a relatively 
unimportant risk factor.
Finally, periods of low interest rates have a negative impact on the insurance sector, a risk 
which is all the greater the less well matched the maturities of its assets and liabillities. This 
situation of pressure arising from the interest rate environment is compounded by the 
general uncertainty stemming from the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which poses 
additional risks for the insurance sector.
The climate of stress, lack of confidence and uncertainty predominating on the financial 
markets is not at all favourable for pension funds and investment funds and the downward 
trend in the net assets of investment funds persists (see Chart 2.15.A). This is, first, a 
consequence of the negative impact of the returns achieved in such a difficult environment 
as the present one, and, second, of the subscriptions net of withdrawals, since the former 
are not sufficient to offset the latter (see Chart 2.15.B). Factors responsible for this situation 
are the financial market situation, and probably the greater competition with the banking 
sector to attract savings.
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3  THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD AND MACRO-PRUDENTIAL OVERSIGHT 
IN EUROPE
The crisis, which began more than four years ago, has underlined the need to improve 
various aspects of financial regulation and supervision, which were unable to prevent an 
excessive build-up of risks in the financial system. One of the main lessons learned is the 
need to complement the improvements in traditional prudential oversight with the new 
emphasis on the so-called “macro-prudential approach”. In contrast with the micro-prudential 
approach, which focuses on ensuring the solvency of the components of the financial 
system on an individual basis, the objective of the macro-prudential approach is to guarantee 
the soundness of the financial system as a whole, paying particular attention to interactions 
between agents in the financial system, and between the latter and the real economy. 
In this context, multilateral organisations such as the G-20 and the Financial Stability 
Board have insisted on the need to develop new macro-prudential frameworks to correct 
the shortfalls detected. In response to this demand, the main developed economies have 
created new authorities in charge of macro-prudential supervision, such as the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council in the United States or the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) in the EU.
The ESRB was conceived as an essential component of the new architecture of the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). The three new European Supervisory Authorities, 
the Joint Committee of the European Authorities and the national supervisory authorities of 
Member States are also part of this new architecture. Following a complex legislative 
process and several months of preparatory work, the legislation regulating the functioning of 
the ESRB came into force on 16 December 2010 and the institution began to function 
officially on 1 January 2011.
The main decision-making body of the ESRB is its General Board. It consists of the following 
members with voting rights: the President of the ECB (who will chair the ESRB for the first 
five years), the Vice-President of the ECB, the Governors of the central banks of Member 
States, one representative of the European Commission and the chairpersons of the three 
European Supervisory Authorities, in addition to four representatives of the advisory 
committees of the ESRB. Additionally, the representatives of the national supervisory 
authorities and the President of the Economic and Financial Committee (representing the 
Council) are members without voting rights. Therefore, the design of the ESRB confers a 
fundamental role on central bank representatives, who have an ample majority. 
The size of this body, in which more than 60 institutions are represented, presents a 
challenge in terms of its effective management. However, this design has the advantage of 
including all the institutions which can contribute relevant information and experience and, 
consequently, it will have a very broad perspective of the financial system’s problems as a 
whole. The General Board will hold four meetings a year, although extraordinary meetings 
may be convened when so required. 
The ESRB is responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the EU’s financial system, 
in order to prevent or mitigate systemic risks which may threaten the EU’s financial stability 
as a result of developments in the financial system and paying particular attention to the 
general performance of the economy. The ultimate goal of the ESRB is to avoid fresh bouts 
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of widespread financial crisis in the future and to ensure that the financial system makes a 
sustainable contribution to economic growth.
Therefore, the ESRB has a broad mandate covering all the institutions, products and 
infrastructures in the financial system and pays attention to interrelationships within the 
financial system (the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk) and potential risks 
stemming from the relationship between financial activity and the economic cycle (time 
dimension of systemic risk). The two essential elements of the ESRB’s mission are prevention, 
which requires anticipation to minimise the probability of bouts of financial instability, and 
mitigation, which focuses on limiting the consequences for the financial system and the 
economy as a whole should a risk materialise (that is, making the system more robust and 
increasing its shock-absorbing capacity). 
The regulation defines two policy instruments for the ESRB: warnings and recommendations. 
The warnings draw attention to potential risks to financial stability without specifying which 
actions should be taken to prevent or mitigate them. By contrast, the recommendations 
prescribe specific measures for addressing a particular risk and establish a timeframe for 
them to be applied.
The ESRB’s recommendations are non-binding, since those to whom they are addressed 
have no legal obligation to apply the measures proposed. Their effectiveness is based on 
the formal obligation of the addressees to “act or explain”. Thus, the addressees of the 
recommendations will inform the ESRB about compliance with said recommendations. On 
the basis of these reports, the ESRB will assess the degree of compliance with the 
recommendations and in case of inaction (or inadequate reaction), it may inform the Council 
and, where appropriate, the European Supervisory Authorities.
The warnings and recommendations must be based on sound analytical evidence and 
under no circumstances will they address private components of the financial system 
(individual institutions, infrastructures, etc.), but rather they will be sent to national and 
European authorities. The recommendations may refer to a broad set of “macro-prudential 
policy” instruments. In this respect, work is still ongoing as regards the definition of a set 
of suitable instruments to achieve macro-prudential policy objectives. In general, the vast 
majority of instruments which are considered for use are traditional prudential tools that have 
been readjusted for macro-prudential purposes. Some notable examples in this connection 
are counter-cyclical capital buffers, dynamic provisions and capital charges for systemically 
important institutions. 
Warnings and recommendations may be public or confidential. Their publication may 
make it easier for measures to be adopted by the addresses and it could contribute to 
improving the general public’s understanding of the ESRB’s activity. However, when 
deciding about the possible publication of warnings and recommendations the potential 
adverse effects of disseminating them should be assessed. On occasions, the matters 
discussed will be extremely sensitive and should the ESRB point out specific risks, it could 
lead to exacerbating rather than mitigating the risks to the system as a whole. For this 
reason, the publication of warnings and recommendations is studied on a case-by-case 
basis and requires an ample majority (of two-thirds) of the ESRB’s General Board.
In short, the ESRB’s core activities comprise compiling information about the financial 
system, identifying and prioritising potential systemic risks, issuing public or private 
warnings and recommendations, where it is considered that these risks are important, and 
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monitoring compliance with recommendations. Furthermore, the ESRB may informally 
convey its opinions on important issues for financial stability to national and European 
authorities. Also, in accordance with law, when the ESRB considers that an emergency 
could occur, it will issue a confidential warning to the Council. Finally, the ESRB must play 
an important role in achieving suitable coordination within the framework of the European 
System of Financial Supervision as well as with international or multilateral bodies with 
macro-prudential responsibilities such as the IMF, the Financial Stability Board or macro-
prudential authorities which have been created recently in other countries.
Pursuant to law, the ESRB is attributed a central role in the prevention and mitigation of 
systemic risk. By contrast, it has no direct powers in the area of crisis management and 
resolution (although the Council may request its assistance, if considered necessary). 
Therefore, its design is more appropriate for tackling the possible problems that emerge for 
financial stability in the medium and long term than for helping to manage these risks once 
they have materialised. However, the ESRB has begun to function in a convulsive period 
of considerable threats to financial stability in the EU. Consequently, in the early months of 
the ESRB’s existence, it has had to combine creating its basic operating structures and 
studying possible sources of systemic risk in the medium term with analysing more 
immediate and pressing problems which are currently affecting the EU’s financial system.
From a short-term perspective, the ESRB has followed up exhaustively the situation of 
Europe’s financial system with the purpose of identifying and prioritising the main risks 
currently threatening the EU’s financial stability. The ESRB’s analysis underlines the 
deterioration of the situation in recent months. The main causes of concern are the risks 
stemming from the interplay between sovereign risk, financing problems in the banking 
system and the poorer outlook for economic growth. Furthermore, uncertainties about 
sovereign debt markets in the euro area have been transmitted from relatively small 
economies to larger countries, with the result that the current problems threaten the 
financial stability of the EU as a whole, that is, they are systemic. This uncertainty is 
reflected in various signs of market stress such as higher sovereign debt spreads, increased 
market volatility or lower availability of dollar-funding to European banks (which has led 
central banks to set up dollar-denominated liquidity assistance).
In tandem with this analysis of the current situation, the ESRB has been working on the 
creation of a conceptual framework to analyse and appropriately prioritise risks, together 
with a clear definition of the instruments available for developing an effective macro-
prudential policy. In parallel with these general tasks, the ESRB has been studying a variety 
of specific aspects which could conceivably threaten the stability of the EU’s financial 
system in the medium and long term. These include, most notably, the proliferation of 
lending in foreign currencies in certain EU countries, especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Recent fluctuations in certain exchange rates illustrate the risks incurred by 
households and corporations which enter into loans denominated in a currency other than 
the legal tender in their country. The ESRB has analysed this subject and worked on 
identifying a set of measures aimed at mitigating the credit, liquidity and financing risks, 
among others, which could stem from this activity. As a result, on 10 October the ESRB 
agreed for the first time to publish a set of measures to prevent and mitigate the risks 
associated with lending in foreign currencies.
The ESRB is analysing many aspects of the financial system, including most notably: the 
implications for financial stability of the retail marketing of complex financial products; the effect 
of a low-interest rate environment on certain agents’ incentives to assume risk; the growing
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“financialisation” of commodity markets; the interconnectedness of financial markets; the 
behaviour and emergence of new “systemic components”; and the development of products 
(such as Exchange Traded Funds) or market practices (such as high frequency trading) 
which could ultimately pose new threats to financial stability. It can be expected that in the 
next few months the work in all these areas will make it possible to identify new potential 
sources of systemic risk and that, in certain cases, the ESRB may issue new (public or 
private) warnings or recommendations aimed at preventing them.
...financial system 
and their implications 
for financial stability
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